In a sudden attack of common sense, a Pentagon-commissioned
study released in mid-November suggests an approach to nuclear nonproliferation
in the Middle East that might actually be accepted by the people of the region.
What is this breakthrough idea? That U.S. policies begin not with a country that
currently lacks nuclear weapons - Iran - but rather with the one that by
virtually all accounts already has them - Israel.
To avert Iran's
apparent drive for nuclear weapons, concludes Henry Sokolski, a co-editor of
"Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran," Israel should freeze and begin to
dismantle its nuclear capability.
This and other recommendations emerged
from two years of deliberations by experts on the Middle East and nuclear
nonproliferation.
Limiting the spread of nuclear weapons is a pivotal
U.S. foreign policy objective. As the sole nation ever to have employed them, we
bear a special responsibility to prevent their use in the future. With regard to
the Middle East, we rightly worry not only about the potential use of the
weapons themselves but about the political leverage bestowed on those who would
possess them.
However, there is an Achilles heel in our nonproliferation
policy: the double standard that U.S. administrations since the 1960s have
applied with respect to Israel's weapons of mass destruction. Israel's suspected
arsenal includes chemical, biological and about 100 to 200 nuclear warheads, and
the capacity to deliver them.
Initially, the United States opposed
Israel's nuclear weapons program. President Kennedy dispatched inspectors to the
Dimona generating plant in Israel's south, and he cautioned Israel against
developing atomic weapons. Anticipating the 1962 visit of American inspectors,
Israel reportedly constructed a fake wall at Dimona to conceal its weapons
production.
Since then, no U.S. administration has effectively pressured
Israel to either halt its program or to submit to inspections under the
International Atomic Energy Agency. Nor has Israel been required to sign the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The apparent rationale: Weapons of mass
destruction in the hands of an ally are simply not an urgent concern.
Yet
this rationale neglects a fundamental law of arms proliferation. Nations seek
WMD when their rivals already possess them. Israel's nuclear capability has
clearly fueled WMD ambitions within the Middle East. Saddam Hussein, for
example, in an April 1990 speech to his military, threatened to retaliate
against any Israeli nuclear attack with chemical weapons - the "poor man's
atomic bomb."
Washington's inconsistency on the nuclear issue in the
Middle East has been terribly corrosive of American legitimacy throughout the
world, and a reversal of our policy would be widely noted regionally.
Nor
is our international legitimacy all that is at stake. During the 1973
Arab-Israeli war, a panicky Israel, facing early battlefield losses, threatened
a nuclear strike. This evoked a massive arms shipment from the United States,
eventually permitting Israel to turn the tide of the war - demonstrating the
kinds of pressures that nuclear powers can apply, even on allies. Although many
view Israel's victory with favor, it surely enabled subsequent decades of
Israeli intransigence over the fate of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and has
contributed to the impasse afflicting the region.
The study's authors
include retired Israeli Brig. Gen. Shlomo Brom and Patrick Clawson, deputy
director of the pro-Israeli Washington Institute for Near East Policy - in
short, no enemies of Israel. Their suggestion is comparatively mild: Israel
should take small, reversible steps toward nuclear disarmament to encourage Iran
to abandon its nuclear ambitions. Nonetheless, Israeli leaders reportedly have
already demurred.
One can anticipate the bipartisan stampede of U.S.
lawmakers to denounce the recommendation should it win official U.S. backing.
That would be a shame. Sooner or later, common sense must prevail in our Middle
East policy. Otherwise, we will continue to run our global stature into the
ground.
George Bisharat is a professor of law at Hastings College of the
Law in San Francisco and writes frequently on law and politics in the Middle
East.


